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Stipends—payments to students as part of their studies—are a major form
of income for graduate students in science and engineering (S&E) and a
potential determinant of decisions to undertake graduate study.1 Broadly
deﬁned to include fellowships, research assistantships, teaching assistant-
ships, and postdoc awards, stipends account for upwards of one-fourth of
the lifetime incomes of S&E Ph.D.s, depending on ﬁeld, time to degree, and
prevalence and length of postdocs.2In addition, fellowships are potentially
the most attractive stipend because they signal to students that the grant-
ing institution views them as top prospects for success in graduate study
and is willing to support their studies rather than requiring them to work
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1. In the 1990s, about two-thirds of S&E grad students received stipend support of some
form and thus did not have to rely on loans, personal ﬁnances, or money from family and
friends as their primary means of support (National Science Board 2004).
2. Fellowships pay much less than faculty jobs, but the fact that they are earned early in the
career greatly augments their value relative to earnings from full-time employment. Using a
ﬁve percent discount rate, a $30,000 fellowship received at the ﬁrst year of graduate study is
comparable to $49,000 received ten years later, $79,500 received twenty years later, and
$129,300 received thirty years later. The discounting is such that scientists who did ten years
of study and postdoctoral work and then worked for thirty years would earn 29 percent of
their lifetime income during their fellowship years if their annual salary was twice that of their
fellowship and would earn 21 percent of their lifetime income during their fellowship years if
their annual salary was three times that of their fellowship.to cover graduate school expenses. In 2001 13 percent of full-time gradu-
ate students reported that a fellowship or traineeship was their primary
source of graduate support (National Science Foundation 2001a). Slightly
more than one-third of those, or approximately 4 percent of full-time
graduate students, obtained awards from federal government sources (Na-
tional Science Board 2004).
Since its establishment in 1952, the National Science Foundation’s (NSF)
Graduate Research Fellowship (GRF) has been the United State’s premier
award for science and engineering graduate students. The NSF’s stated
purpose for the Graduate Research Fellowship is to “ensure the vitality 
of the scientiﬁc and technological workforce in the United States and to re-
inforce its diversity.” Because NSF fellowships are limited to citizens or
permanent resident aliens, they are a potentially important policy tool for
inducing citizens and residents, including those from underrepresented
groups, to study S&E and thus to raise their representation in the S&E
workforce.
What determines the likelihood that an applicant wins a GRF award?
Has the composition of applicants and awardees changed over time? What
is the supply response of students to increases in the number or the amount
of fellowships? How might alternative fellowship policies aﬀect the num-
bers and measured attributes of awardees? Can we generalize from the re-
sponse of students to GRFs to the possible impact of stipends on the sup-
ply of students to S&E more broadly?
This chapter uses data from the NSF’s 1952 to 1993 Cumulative Index
(CI) ﬁle, its ensuing updates, and other sources to examine these ques-
tions. The Cumulative Index plus updated data provides information on the 
over 200,000 individuals who applied for NSF graduate fellowships from
1952 through 2004, including the student’s graduate record exam scores
(GREs), grade point average (GPA), ratings of reference letters, (and from
1976 on), the ratings of applicants by review panels. We supplement these
data with information on the earnings of college graduates, unemployment
rates, and the sizes of graduating bachelor’s cohorts. To determine the ef-
fects of changes in the number of GRFs and the amount of awards on the
number of applicants and quality of awardees, we use time series ﬂuctua-
tions in the awards as the exogenous variation necessary to identify student
supply responses.3
Section 1.1 describes the GRF program and how it has changed over
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3. The 2002 report on the GRF by WestEd looks at what happens to fellows rather than
what attracts students to the fellowships. It shows that in the time period leading up to 1993,
around 70 percent of fellows received their baccalaureate from RU1 institutions (as deﬁned
by the Carnegie Classiﬁcation), and more than 90 percent went on to perform graduate work
at RU1 institutions. Some programs receive a disproportionately high number of fellows: 34
percent of Life Sciences Fellows enrolled in ﬁve institutions. The report shows that eleven
years after beginning their Ph.D. program NSF Fellows had completion rates of around 70
percent, which exceeds the overall completion rate for entering students; that fellows pursuedtime. It ﬁnds that the ratio of GRFs to S&E bachelor’s degrees fell by
nearly 75 percent from the 1950s to the 1990s/2000s; that the distribution
of awards shifted from physics and chemistry to biological sciences, social
sciences, and engineering, and that women and minorities have increased
their share of awards.
Section 1.2 uses a linear probability model to estimate the characteris-
tics that help an applicant win a GRF. It ﬁnds that winning depends greatly
on GREs, GPAs, and reference letters operating through panel ratings,
and that, consistent with NSF’s diversity goal, women and minorities have
higher chances of winning an award than white men with similar attributes.
Section 1.3 shows that an increase in stipend value increases the number
of applicants, including those with very high skills, and thus raises the av-
erage skill of awardees. By contrast, increases in the number of awards are
associated with modest declines in the average quality of awardees.
Section 1.4 explores new ways to determine the number and value of
GRF awards, such as increasing the number and/or value of awards; in-
dexing the number and value to measures of the supply of potential appli-
cants and to the monetary attraction of alternative careers; and giving
awards by the measured academic and personal characteristics of appli-
cants, irrespective of ﬁeld.
1.1 The GRF Program Over Time
Congress established the National Science Foundation’s Graduate Re-
search Fellowship program in 1952 to support the vitality of the scientiﬁc
and technological workforce in the United States. The program was open
to U.S. citizens only. It gave a $1,600 stipend and covered normal tuition
and fees at the institution of choice. The NSF typically supported students
for three years but this was not automatic; students had to reapply each
year. The GRF has changed since its inception.4In 1963 it capped the cost-
of-education, and in 1972 students no longer had to reapply (Goldsmith,
Presley, and Cooley 2002). Today awardees may choose three years of sup-
port over a ﬁve-year period. They must be pursuing a research-based grad-
uate degree in an NSF-supported ﬁeld. The fellowship may be used outside
the United States and is portable across institutions. In 1997 the NSF in-
troduced new selection criteria that put greater weight than in the past in
its awarding fellowships to “broader impacts” such as integration of re-
search and education, diversity, beneﬁt to society, and enhancement of sci-
entiﬁc and technical understanding.
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academic careers more than their peers, and that a slightly larger percentage reported having
achieved traditional measures of accomplishment during graduate school (such as presenta-
tions, refereed articles, edited book parts, etc.).
4. National Science Foundation, Graduate Research Fellowship Program (2007) gives the
details of the program as of 2007. The details change yearly with NSF policies.The number of awards and the dollar value of stipends have changed
over time with NSF budgets and decisions. Figure 1.1 shows the absolute
number of awards and constant dollar value of the stipends from 1952 to
2004. In the 1950s the NSF gave around 500 to 600 awards. In the 1960s it
gave around 1,000 awards, with a peak of 1,373 in 1966. In the 1970s and
1980s the number of awards fell to around 500, then rose in the late 1980s/
early 1990s toward 900 to 1,000. The big jumps in the value of awards re-
ﬂect NSF decisions to raise nominal stipend amounts. The NSF raised the
value of fellowships in the early 1980s to the late 1980s and again in 1999
to 2004.5 In 1999, the Committee of Visitor’s (COV) report evaluating the
program noted that “the GRF awards are no longer as attractive as they
once were” (Committee of Visitors 1999). At $15,000 per year for three
years the awards were signiﬁcantly lower than comparable fellowships. 
The COV speculated that this could (at least partially) explain the steady
decline in applicants in the years leading up to 1999 and recommended 
that the stipend value be raised to $18,000. In the subsequent four years,
the value of the stipend rose 83 percent to $27,500, which prompted the
next COV (convened in 2003) to worry that the stipend was now too large.
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5. The gradual declines in the stipend values in years when the NSF has not raised them re-
ﬂect the impact of inﬂation. The NSF has never reduced the nominal value of awards.
Fig. 1.1 The number and value of GRF awards vary over time.
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets.Universities complained about the negative eﬀects of a support gap be-
tween NSF fellows and other students. The 2003 COV recommended that
the “NSF thoroughly examine the external consequences of the $27,500
stipend and what intended and unintended consequences this might en-
gender” (COV 2003, 13). For the 2005 ﬁscal year, the stipend has been set
at $30,000, with an accompanying $10,500 cost of education allowance.
The roller-coaster behavior of the award amount has prompted some in the
graduate education community to seek a consistent basis for the determi-
nation of stipend levels.
The absolute number of GRF awards of about 900 to 1,000 in recent
years is comparable to the levels in the 1950s. Relative to the increased
supply of S&E bachelor’s graduates, however, the number of awards has
fallen sharply. In 1952 to 1956 NSF awarded 5.4 GRFs per thousand S&E
bachelor’s degrees. In 2000 to 2004 NSF awarded 2.2 GRFs per thousand
S&E bachelor’s degrees—a 60 percent drop. Figure 1.2, which graphs the
number of awards per S&E bachelor’s, shows that the drop occurred dis-
continuously around 1970.6It also shows sizable ﬂuctuations in the ratio of
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6. Since only about 7 percent of U.S. bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering go to the
foreign-born, with little trend over time, it makes little diﬀerence if one uses all bachelor’s
graduates or only nonforeign-born bachelor’s as the base for this calculation.
Fig. 1.2 The number of awards per S&E baccalaureate has shifted downwards.
Source:NSF-DGE, Cumulative Index and related Datasets. Bachelor’s degree data tabulated
by National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Studies; data from Depart-
ment of Education.awardees to BS graduates due to changing numbers of awards granted be-
fore 1970.
1.1.1 Field and Demographic Distribution of Awards
In the early years of the program, GRF awards went largely to physical
sciences and mathematics and disproportionately to white men. Today,
larger shares go to biological sciences, social sciences, and engineering,
and also to women and minorities. Figure 1.3shows the huge change in the
distribution of awards among ﬁelds. From 1952 to 1956 the physical sci-
ences obtained 49 percent of the awards, math received 9 percent, and life
sciences obtained 25 percent compared to 4 percent in psychology and so-
cial sciences and 13 percent in engineering. In 2004, by contrast, 15 percent
of awards were given to the physical sciences, 11 percent to mathematics
and computer sciences, and 27 percent to life sciences; 30 percent were
given in engineering and 17 percent in social sciences and psychology.
Given NSF policy to award approximately the same proportion of ap-
plicants among ﬁelds, the shift in awards among disciplines largely reﬂects
a change in the distribution of applications among disciplines. Consistent
with this, ﬁgure 1.4 shows that before 1990 the proportion of applicants
who won awards in the major discipline categories were within a few per-
centage points of each other, although social science and psychology were
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Fig. 1.3 The GRF disciplinary distribution over time of applicants
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets.slightly disfavored. This is still the case after 1990, except that applicants in
engineering and computer science have a higher chance of getting an
award due to the process by which the NSF seeks to attract women to these
disciplines.
Turning to the demographic characteristics of awardees, ﬁgure 1.5shows
a sharp rise in the proportion of women and underrepresented minorities7
winning the GRF since the program was initiated. The female proportion
of awardees climbed from about 5 percent in the 1950s to 55 percent of
awards in 2004, with considerable variation among ﬁelds. Women make up
roughly three-quarters of the awardees in life sciences, social science, or
psychology compared to 20 percent of awardees in physical science or
computer science. Around 1960, the female proportion in life science was
about 25 percent, and in physical science it was around 6 percent, while
there were barely any female engineering fellows.8 To increase the female
representation in these ﬁelds, NSF set up the Women in Engineering Pro-
gram (WENG) in 1990, which became the Women in Engineering and
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7. Underrepresented Minorities in S&E include African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans. Asian Americans are overrepresented in science and engineering.
8. In 1960 there were few computer science fellows, either male or female.
Fig. 1.4 Percentage of applicants who gain GRF awards, selected years
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets.Computer Science (WECS) program in 1993. This program boosts the
number of females by awarding fellowships to all or nearly all computer
science or engineering women in NSF’s quality group 2, and by making
women in quality group 3 also eligible for awards if enough slots are avail-
able.9 The data in ﬁgure 1.4 show that in 2001 applicants in computer sci-
ence and engineering had a higher ratio of awards to applicants than other
disciplines as a result of this program.
The data in ﬁgure 1.5 on the proportion of underrepresented minorities
(URM) among GRF fellows starts in 1976 due to lack of ethnicity data 
before then. The GRF data is further complicated by the development in
1978 of the Minority Graduate Fellowship Program (MGF), which gave
awards solely to underrepresented minorities, and its dissolution in 1998.
The MGF was oﬃcially a separate program, although executed in parallel
with the GRF. In 1999, the ﬁrst program year since 1975 without the MGF,
the NSF emphasized procedural changes in its review panel process in the
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9. As described following, NSF categorizes applicants by group depending on their mea-
sured scholastic skills. All quality group 1 applicants are oﬀered GRFs, and a sizable pro-
portion of group 2 applicants are also given GRFs.
Fig. 1.5 Percentages of fellows who are women or URMs
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets.hope of maintaining a diverse awardee pool, partly by attracting more ap-
plicants through expanded outreach, and partly via other measures such as
insuring a diverse group of panelists (COV 2003). Combining the fellows
from the GRF and the MGF, the URM proportion is around 10 percent in
the early 1980s, and climbed to 30 percent in 1998, the last year of the pro-
gram. After that, the percentage dropped to the GRF-only proportion of
around 10 percent, which is still much larger than the 1 to 2 percent two
decades earlier. The disciplinary variation for URM fellows shows a dis-
proportionately large proportion in social science and psychology.
The increased diversity in GRFs reﬂects two factors. First is that as a re-
sult of these programs and eﬀorts, the likelihood that a woman or minor-
ity applicant would get an award has risen. In the ﬁrst decade of the GRF,
the overall award rate10was 17 percent while the award rate for women was
12 percent, as shown in ﬁgure 1.6. By the mid-1990s the female award rate
exceeded the overall rate. The award rate for URMs in the GRF was low at
3 percent during the run of the MGF. The combined rate of URMs in both
the GRF and MGF topped 18 percent from 1994 to 1998, which is actually
greater than the MGF-only award rate, 15.3 percent, for the same time pe-
riod.11 After the end of that program, the number of URM awardees per
applicants approached the overall rate of awardees per applicant, though
it is still noticeably lower by several percentage points.
The second and more important reason for the increased diversity of
GRFs is that an increasing share of bachelor’s degrees in science and engi-
neering have gone to women and minorities. This has raised the proportion
of applicants from these groups, which in turn produces an increased share
of awards, coupled with the NSF’s eﬀorts to improve diversity.
1.2 Determinants of GRF Awards
The GRF is a merit-based award. Each year, the NSF assembles a panel
of experts to evaluate and rate applications and arrange them into quality
groups. Quality Group 1 (QG1) is the highest quality group, and all appli-
cants deemed ﬁt for this group are oﬀered the fellowship. Quality Group 2
(QG2) applicants are regarded as suﬃciently meritorious for the fellowship,
but not all in this category will receive the award. Applicants in other qual-
ity groups rarely receive the fellowship, but may receive an honorable men-
tion, which carries some nonmonetary prestige. As with other aspects of the
program, the procedures for determining awardees have evolved. Presently,
panelists meet in groups arranged by discipline for an intensive two to three
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10. “Award rate” is synonymous with “awardee to applicant ratio.”
11. The explanation for this result lies in the high incidence of duplicate applications. Data
was available from 1994 to 1998 to match applicants in the two programs, and we found that
approximately 90 percent of those who applied for the MGF also submitted an application
for the GRF.day session, which includes a brieﬁng on the GRF program and a calibra-
tion exercise using applications from previous years. The categorization
process consists of cycles during which the panelists score the applications
on a scale from 1.00 to 4.99 (the lower number indicating higher quality),
and then rank them. In the ﬁrst cycle, at least two panelists score each ap-
plication. Any applicants ranked below the sixty-fourth percentile are put
in QG4 and no longer considered for the fellowship. A third panelist scores
remaining applications and the applications are reranked. Approximately
55 percent of the awardees are from QG1, all of whom receive an award.
Virtually all of the other awards are from QG2, with approximately 60 per-
cent of QG2 applicants oﬀered the fellowship (NSF 2002).
From 1998 to the present, NSF has instructed panelists to evaluate ap-
plications based on the two broad criteria common to NSF solicitations:
intellectual meritand broader impacts.The panelists are given rating sheets
upon which intellectual merit is broken down into subcriteria: GPA, GRE
scores, references, proposed research, and previous research experience.
Broader impacts are based on integration of research and education, di-
versity, beneﬁt to society, and enhancement of scientiﬁc and technical un-
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Fig. 1.6 Average percentage of applicants winning awards in selected time periods,
by broad demographic group
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets.
Notes: Data on ethnic demography only available beginning in 1976. From 1994–1998, the
available data allows the identiﬁcation of duplicate applicants to both the MGF and GRF. To
calculate “URMs in GRF+ MGF” the total number of unique fellows in either program was
divided by the total number of unique applicants. The ﬁnal year of the MGF program 
was 1998.derstanding. The NSF emphasizes a comprehensive concept of merit, and
advises panelists to avoid placing too much emphasis on the easily quan-
tiﬁable quality measures such as GRE scores and GPA. In the latest pro-
gram years, GRE scores are not required on the GRF application. Further,
there is a new emphasis on the value of leadership skills in NSF fellows
(COV 2003). It is possible that future applicants will be asked to provide
evidence of leadership potential, and future panelists will include this in
their assessment of merit.
Because the NSF recognizes the value of a diverse workforce, the pro-
gram implements measures to insure representation in geography, demo-
graphics, and discipline. Speciﬁcally, the applicants from Quality Group 2
who receive the fellowship are chosen based on an algorithm that includes
their rank within QG2, but also other factors. The key policy with respect
to discipline is that NSF allocates the number of QG1 and QG2 positions
to review panels on the basis of the disciplinary distribution of all appli-
cants and the number of awards NSF plans to oﬀer.
1.2.1 Regression Analysis
To see how the selection procedure uses the information on student skills
to determine which applicants win awards, we estimated linear probability
models in which the dependent variable is the 0/1 measure of obtaining an
award and the explanatory variables consist of measures of student skills
from the NSF’s Cumulative Index data set. The CI has recorded the scores
that a panelist gives to an application starting in 1976, but does not record
assessments of the subcriteria, which limits our choice of measures largely
to the quantitative and verbal GRE scores, the GPA, and the scoring of ref-
erence letters. Table 1.1lists the measures of scholastic skills in the data and
gives their mean values and standard deviations, as well as the overall mean
of the probability of winning the GRF award, and the scales used to mea-
sure each quantity. The GRE scores are coded on a 200 to 800 scale; the
GPA uses a four point scale; reference scores were originally scaled from
ten to seventy, with lower scores being better; ﬁnally the Panel Ratings12
(which reﬂect the GRE, GPA, and reference scores) were originally coded
on a scale of 100 to 600, again with lower score representing higher quality
applicants. The panel ratings and reference scores changed scales at vari-
ous times in GRF history. To deal with this, we normalized the panel and
reference data such that they have zero mean and standard deviation of one
in the applicant pool of each year. We also reverse-coded the actual panel
and reference scores, so that increases in all variables imply a more favor-
able situation. Regression coeﬃcients for GRE scores are sometimes re-
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12. In the original Cumulative Index data set, each applicant may have more than one panel
rating if more than one panelist reviewed the application. An average panel ratingwas trivially
generated for each applicant. In this chapter, “panel rating” means “average panel rating.”
Similarly, “reference score” is synonymous with “average reference score.”ported in tables with the scores scaled as GREQuant/100 or GREVerbal/
100, which eﬀectively puts them on a two to eight point scale.13 Note in the
table that applicants have higher GRE quantitative scores than they have
GRE verbal scores, so that while the standard deviations of scores are sim-
ilar, the coeﬃcient of variation is lower for the quantitative score than for
the verbal score.
Table 1.2records linear regressions of the impact of scholastic attributes,
demographic factors, and ﬁeld dummies for nearly the full data set from
1955 to 1998, which lacks measures of minority status, panel scores, and
reference letters; and for the 1976 to 1998 period when we have data on
those measures as well as the others. The column (1) and (2) regressions do
not include the panel rating, while the column (3) regression includes the
panel rating. The column (1) estimates show that over the entire period,
GRE Quantitative, GRE Verbal, and GPAs have sizable and signiﬁcant
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Table 1.1 Means, standard deviations, and scaling of the quantitative measures of
applicant scholastic skills
Summary for key data in
Total time period Records Overall award rate
the GRF dataﬁles 1952–2004 271,391 13.50%
Data available Mean STD Full range
1976–1993 328 115 100 to 600
Panel ratings
1994–1998 315 118 100 to 600
1999 3.11 1.02 1.00 to 6.00
2000–2004 2.90 0.85 1.00 to 4.99
Reference score
1954–1993 24.2 8.7 10 to 70
1994–1998 1.91 0.65 1 to 7
GRE quantitative 1952–2004 691 100 200 to 800
GRE verbal 1952–2004 606 104 200 to 800
GPA 1955–1998 3.49 0.40 1 to 4
1976–2004 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Ethnicity
1981–1987 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
1988–2000 (A, B, C, D, E, F, H, I, J)
2000–2004 (t, f) or (y, n, b)
Gender
1952–2000 (m, f)
2001–2004 (m, f, b)
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF program and
related data sets.
Notes:For analysis, Panel ratings and Reference scores will be normalized such that they have
mean zero and standard deviation one in the applicant pool of each year. These variables are
also recoded such that higher values denote better ratings. For GRE quantitative and GRE
verbal, values in original data set above 800 set to 800. For GPA, full range (0 to 3) before
1971, values shifted by  1. A separate variable codes each ethnic category. For Gender, value
of “b” indicates “decline to answer.”
13. This allows us to report coeﬃcients concisely as 0.XX rather than 0.00XX.eﬀects on the probability of obtaining the GRF. A 100 point increase in
Verbal GRE score raises the probability of award by 6.4 percent. This
might not seem large, but since just 13.5 percent of applicants get an award
this raises the probability of getting an award by nearly 50 percent. The
higher eﬀect of the Verbal GRE than of the Quantitative GRE may seem
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Table 1.2 Linear probability model for the impact of scholastic and demographic
variables on GRF awards
Oﬀered Award
1955–1998 1976–1998 1976–1998
Panel rating — — 0.170
(0.001)
Reference score 0.082 0.074 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GRE quantitative/100 0.034 0.035  0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GRE verbal/100 0.060 0.066 0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GPA 0.089 0.095  0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Female — 0.033 0.037
(0.002) (0.002)
Minority — 0.087 0.077
(0.004) (0.003)
Field eﬀects:
Chemistry  0.003 0.011 0.045
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Computer science  0.007 0.009 0.115
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Engineering 0.022 0.048 0.093
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Earth/atmospheric 0.033 0.034 0.049
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Life science 0.037 0.034 0.040
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Math  0.019  0.012 0.051
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Physics/astronomy  0.030  0.006 0.060
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Psychology 0.000 0.005 0.018
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Social science — — —
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 207,498 107,658 107,597
R2 0.198 0.1793 0.2731
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF program and
related data sets.surprising, given the presumably greater importance of quantitative think-
ing in science and engineering. It reﬂects the fact that the Verbal GRE is
often the key distinguishing factor between applicants with similarly high
Quantitative GREs. Finally, the calculations show that women and mi-
norities have higher chances of getting an award than other applicants. The
ﬁeld dummy variables show some variation in the probability of getting an
award among ﬁelds. Engineering, life science, and earth/atmospheric sci-
ence have signiﬁcantly higher probabilities of getting an award while math-
ematics has a lower one compared to the omitted social science group.
The results in column (2), which include the measure of the quality of
references and dummy variables for gender and minority status for the pe-
riod 1976 to 1998 are similar: GREs, the GPA, and the reference scores are
key determinants of the probability of getting an award, while women and
minorities have a higher probability of gaining awards. The dummy vari-
ables for ﬁelds show moderate disciplinary variation. Column (3) adds the
panel rating to the list of variables. Since the NSF panels weigh heavily the
eﬀect of GREs, GPAs, and reference scores in deciding which applicants
should be given awards, inclusion of the panel rating alters the estimated
coeﬃcients markedly. The coeﬃcients on factors on which panels place
most weight in their evaluation fall relative to those that enter less highly in
the panel rating. The GRE quantitative score and the GPA obtain negative
coeﬃcients conditional on the panel rating, implying that the panels weigh
those factors especially heavily in their ratings. In addition, conditional on
the panel ratings the ﬁeld dummies become large and signiﬁcant relative to
the omitted social science group. This presumably reﬂects the initial allo-
cation of the number of QG1 and QG2 positions on the basis of the disci-
plinary distribution of applicants, which leads panels in the quantitative
and physical sciences to give lower ratings than those in the social sciences
to applicants with comparable measured scholastic skills. From this per-
spective, the estimated positive coeﬃcients on the ﬁeld dummies in table
1.1 are a correction that takes account of the attributes of applicants in
these ﬁelds.
Consistent with this interpretation, table 1.3shows that panel ratings are
indeed lower for applicants with the same measured scholastic skills in
physical sciences than in the social sciences. For instance, the regression
shows that an applicant in chemistry obtains a –0.198 lower panel rating
than an applicant in the omitted social science group with the same GREs,
GPA, reference score, and demographics. The rank correlation of the order-
ing of ﬁelds between the table 1.3 estimates of the panel ratings and the or-
dering of ﬁelds in the column (3) of table 1.2 is –0.92 (inclusive of the omit-
ted group). Thus, the modest estimated impacts of ﬁelds in columns (1) and
(2) of table 1.2 reﬂect two oﬀsetting factors: lower panel ratings in physical
sciences but an oﬀsetting higher probability of getting an award condi-
tional on panel ratings in those disciplines.
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As noted, the table 1.2 regressions for obtaining a GRF show that
women and minorities have a greater probability of getting an award than
do majority men with similar measured scholastic skills. This is consistent
with the goal of increasing the diversity of the S&E workforce. The table
1.3 regression of the panel ratings on scholastic skills and demographic
characteristics show, however, that panels give lower scores to women than
to majority men with the same measured attributes while they give higher
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Table 1.3 Regression coeﬃcients and standard errors for scholastic and
demographic determinants of average panel rating, 1976–1998


































Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF program and
related data sets.scores to minorities than to majority men with the same measured attri-
butes. Since the probability of getting an award is higher for both women
and minorities than for majority men, the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients in panel
ratings suggests that the process of taking account of diversity diﬀers be-
tween the two groups.
To unpack this diﬀerence, we estimated a recursive model. First, we re-
lated the panel scores and the probability of being assigned to groups 1 and
2 to demographic characteristics. Then we examined the probability of get-
ting an award conditional on being in groups 1 and 2 and on the panel rat-
ing. Table 1.4 gives the results of this analysis for 1990 to 1997 and 1998 to
2004. The data for 1990 to 1997 includes measures of GRE scores, GPA,
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Assigned conditional Assigned conditional 
quality on being  quality  on being 
Panel group group Panel  group  group 
rating 1 or 2 1 or 2 rating 1 or 2 1 or 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female  0.012  0.021 0.38 0.135 0.024 0.25
(0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012)
Minority  0.003 0.076 0.072 0.161 0.091 0.073
(0.009) (0.004) (0.041) (0.015) (0.006) (0.021)
Panel rating — — 0.275 — — 0.546
(0.039) (0.028)
Quantitative/100 0.263 0.035 — 0.334 0.081 —
(0.004) (0.002) — (0.007) (0.003) —
Verbal/ 100 0.235 0.074 — 0.285 0.093 —
(0.003) (0.002) — (0.005) (0.002) —
GPA 0.634 0.118 — — — —
(0.010) (0.004) — — — —
Reference 0.289 0.093 — — — —
(0.003) (0.002) — — — —
Field eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,821 47,851 4,904 41,404 41,404 5,695
R2 0.5882 0.2109 0.1445 0.215 0.0901 0.1574
Source:NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF program and related data
sets.
Notes: For comparison with the 1998–2004 analyses, we estimated the 1990–1997 equations excluding
GPA and reference scores. The coeﬃcients (standard error) on the dummy for female barely changed: it
was  0.012 (.006) in the panel rating equation and  0.026 (.003) in the equation for being assigned to
group 1 or 2. For minorities, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for minority status in the panel rating became
 0.241 (.011). The implication is that GPA and reference scores for minority applicants were much
lower than for others. But the probability of being assigned to group 1 or 2 gave to minorities a positive,
though smaller, coeﬃcient than in the table, .018(.003).and a measure of the quality of reference letters. The 1998 to 2004 data do
not include GPA or the quality of reference letters, and cover the period
when NSF revised its merit criteria. Column (1) shows that in 1990 to 1997
women received a slightly lower score than men from review panels while
minorities received comparable panel ratings as the majority group.
Women also were less likely to be assigned to quality groups 1 and 2 than
men, while by contrast minority applicants were more likely to be assigned
to those groups. Among persons in groups 1 and 2, and conditional on
panel ratings, women were much more likely to obtain awards than men
while minority applicants had a modestly higher probability of obtaining
awards. Thus, the higher probability of women getting awards occurs at 
the last stage, presumably in part because the WECS (WENG) pro-
gram boosted the chances that women in quality group 2 would get GRFs,
whereas the higher probability of minorities getting awards occurs because
panels were more likely to assign them into groups 1 or 2. To make sure that
this interpretation is not marred by the availability of GPA and reference
scores in the 1998 to 2004 period but not earlier, we estimated the 1990 to
1997 equations excluding those variables. As noted in the table note, the co-
eﬃcient on females barely changed with their exclusion.
The 1998 to 2004 regressions show a very diﬀerent pattern, indicating
that the change in NSF’s policies in awarding GRFs had a substantial
eﬀect on the awards process. Column (4) shows that panels give both
women and minorities higher ratings in 1998 to 2004 than in 1990 to 1997.
Column (5) shows that panels are more likely to assign them to quality
groups 1 or 2 than in 1990 to 1997. The coeﬃcient on being female in col-
umn (6) shows that, conditional on being in groups 1 or 2, the boost given
to women in the probability of getting an award was more moderate in 1998
to 2004 than in 1990 to 1997, presumably because they were getting higher
panel ratings and having a higher chance of being assigned to quality
groups 1 or 2. By contrast, the coeﬃcient on being minority in column (6)
is nearly identical to the coeﬃcient in column (3). Finally, panel ratings
have a stronger impact on awards in 1998 to 2004 than in 1990 to 1997. In
sum, table 1.4 provides evidence for the change in NSF’s emphasis that was
enacted, at least partly, to increase diversity in S&E ﬁelds.
Finally, table 1.5 uses a regression model to examine the GRE scores of
applicants with diﬀerent demographic characteristics from 1976 to 2004—
a period in which the proportion of applicants who were women or minor-
ity increased substantially. In 2004 there were 8,939 applicants, of whom 46
percent were women and 10 percent underrepresented minorities. In 1976,
there were 5,366 applicants, of whom 30 percent were women and 4 per-
cent were underrepresented minorities. To the extent that increased num-
bers of applicants draw persons with decreasing measured scholastic skills,
one would expect that the increased proportion of women and minorities
would reduce the average scores of those groups.
The coeﬃcients and standard errors on the demographic variables in the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.table show the opposite pattern, particularly for GRE quantitative scores.
The scores of both women and minority applicants rise relative to those of
majority men, though both groups still score lower. The coeﬃcient on the
dummy for women rises from –41.7 in 1976 to 1983 to –28.9 in 1999 to
2004. The coeﬃcient on being black rises from –175.9 in 1976 to 1984 to 
–100.1 in 1999 to 2004. The negative coeﬃcient on being Hispanic changes
less evenly but is lower in 1999 to 2004 than in 1976 to 1983, while that for
other minorities shows little change. The regression coeﬃcients for GRE
verbal scores tell a similar story, with the exception that women applicants
go from having the same verbal scores as men in 1976 to 1983 to a modest
7.2 lower score in 1999 to 2004. The coeﬃcient for being black, however,
advances steadily from –168.7 to –100.4. Overall, the results show that the
increased proportion of female and minority GRFs was associated with
generally improved measured skills. The implication is that the GRF pro-
gram is attracting increasingly qualiﬁed women and minorities.
1.3 Supply Responses of GRF Applicants
The NSF has two policy levers that can aﬀect the supply of applicants to
the GRF program and, given the process of granting awards, that can de-
termine the measured skills of awardees: the dollar amount of the awards
and the number of awards.
Increasing the dollar value of awards should increase the number of ap-
plicants. It could increase or decrease the average measured skill of appli-
cantsdepending on whether they come largely from persons with the high-
est skills or from those with lower skills. But given the process of selecting
awardees, increases in the value of awards should increase the average skill
of awardees as long as the increased value of awards attract some persons
with high skills. This is because review panels would be expected to select
high skill candidates from the pool of newly attracted persons over less
skilled candidates that they would have selected from the smaller initial
pool of applicants.
Increasing the number of awards, by contrast, is likely to reduce the mea-
sured quality of awardees since it means accepting applicants who would
otherwise be rejected. The key issue here is the extent to which the increase
in numbers reduces quality, which depends on the number of applicants on
the margin of acceptance with similar skills. If there is a large number of
persons on the margin with similar skills, then increasing the numbers of
awards will reduce measured skills modestly. If there is a small number, an
increased number of awards could reduce measured skills substantially.
1.3.1 Number of Applicants
To examine the link between the value of stipends and the pool of GRF
applicants, we calculated a relative value of stipendsby taking the ratio of the
Supporting “The Best and Brightest” in Science and Engineering 37dollar value of GRF awards to the average annual earnings of college grad-
uates aged twenty-one to twenty-ﬁve14 and contrasted this with the relative
number of applicants by dividing the number of applicants by the number 
of S&E bachelor graduates. As ﬁgure 1.7 shows, the two series track each
other closely. For example, the sharp increase in the stipend value in the
1980s, when NSF increased stipend amounts from $3,900 (1979) to $14,000
(1991) is matched by a large rise in the number of applicants relative to S&E
bachelor’s graduates. By contrast, from 1991 to 1999 the relative value of
stipends fell, as the nominal stipend amount rose by $1,000 while college
graduate earnings rose by about $7,600; and the relative number of appli-
cants fell. Since 1999 the nominal amount of the stipend has doubled, and
the number of applications has nearly doubled as well.15
Another factor that might aﬀect the decision to seek a GRF and go on
into graduate school is the ease of ﬁnding work with a bachelor’s degree,
which varies with the business cycle. Figure 1.8compares the relative num-
ber of applicants to the unemployment rate of college graduates.16 Since
the late 1980s, the size of the GRF applicant pool has moved countercycli-
cally: a weak labor market for college graduates generated a higher num-
ber of applicants as a share of bachelor’s degrees. But in the early to mid-
1980s, the unemployment rate fell while the number of applicants rose,
presumably in part because of the increase in stipend amounts shown in
ﬁgure 1.7. Thus, ﬁgure 1.8 suggests that unavailability of jobs for recent
college graduates is a secondary factor inﬂuencing the decision to apply for
a GRF stipend.
Taking the analysis a step further, we amalgamated the data on GRF fel-
lowships into nine major ﬁelds17 by year from 1952 to 2004, to obtain a
cross-ﬁeld time series panel with 477 observations. Using this sample, we
did a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of the number of
GRF applicants in each ﬁeld and year. Since the NSF changes the stipend
value in particular years by policy decision rather than changing it in re-
sponse to the previous years’ labor market, we take these changes as ex-
ogenous and use least squares to estimate the eﬀect of relative stipend val-
ues on the relative number of applicants. To control for ﬁeld diﬀerences
and changes in market conditions by ﬁeld over time, the regressions in-
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14. We estimated the college graduate earnings from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (PUMS) of the March Current Population Survey. College graduates include those
who obtain degrees higher than a bachelor’s degree, but the age range is restrictive enough to
exclude most doctorate recipients.
15. Bachelor’s degree data for 2002 to 2004 are extrapolated because actual ﬁgures are not
available. The key to the change in the ratio of applicants to bachelor’s graduates is that the
number of applicants jumped from 4,852 in 1998 to 8,939 in 2004.
16. Estimated from the annual Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation
Group.
17. The nine ﬁelds are: Chemistry, Computer Science, Earth/Atmospheric Science, Engi-
neering, Life Science, Mathematics Physics, Psychology, and Social Science. The availability
of earnings data for college graduates and degree data by ﬁeld limits the sample to 1968 to
2001.clude ﬁeld dummy variables and separate time trends for the nine ﬁelds. In
addition, the regressions include the number of bachelor’s degrees earned
in the nine ﬁelds in the previous year.18
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18. We recognize that students may apply for a GRF in a diﬀerent ﬁeld than the ﬁeld in
which they earned their undergraduate degree, but still regard the number of undergraduate
degrees as a reasonable indicator of interest in the ﬁeld.
Fig. 1.7 GRF applications relative to S&E bachelor’s degrees and relative value of
GRF stipend, 1968–2004
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and
related datasets. Bachelor’s degree data tabulated by National Science Foundation/Division
of Science Resources Studies; data from Department of Education.
Fig. 1.8 GRF applications relative to S&E bachelor’s degrees and college gradu-
ate unemployment rate, 1979–2004
Source: NSF DGE, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and related datasets. Bachelor’s
degree data tabulated by National Science Foundation/Division of Science Resources Stud-
ies; data from Department of Education. Unemployment data are estimated from the annual
Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group, Bureau of Labor Statistics.Table 1.6 displays the regression results. The basic speciﬁcation in col-
umn (1) shows that a larger number of bachelor graduates in a ﬁeld gener-
ates a larger number of applicants from that ﬁeld; and that stipends in the
previous year have a strongly positive eﬀect on applications, with a near
unitary elasticity. Column (2) adds to the set of explanatory variables the
unemployment rate among college graduates twenty-one to twenty-ﬁve
years of age as an indicator of the availability of alternative jobs for those
contemplating going directly to the job market. The sample size shrinks be-
cause the unemployment variable is only available starting in 1979. Con-
sistent with ﬁgure 1.8, the unemployment rate has a positive eﬀect on the
number of applications in column (2). In column (3) we replace the unem-
ployment rate of twenty-one to twenty-ﬁve-year-olds with the unemploy-
ment rate for all college graduates regardless of age. The eﬀect of unem-
ployment nearly doubles: a one percentage point rise in the unemployment
rate raises the GRFP applications by just over 10 percent, presumably be-
cause a one point increase in unemployment for all graduates is a bigger
economic shock than a one point increase in unemployment for all gradu-
ates is a bigger economic shock than a one point increase for younger grad-
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Table 1.6 Determinants of the number of GRFP applicants, 1969–2004
Dependent variable: ln(applicants in academic 
ﬁeld in current year)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(bachelor’s degrees) by ﬁeld
in current year 0.195 0.304 0.298 0.516
(0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066)
Log(stipend/outside salary) in 
previous year 0.996 0.916 0.852 0.772
(0.084) (0.060) (0.059) (0.056)
Unemp. rate for college grads 
age 21–25 — 0.049 — —
— (0.013) — —
Unemp. rate for all college grads — — 0.104 0.094
— — (0.024) (0.022)
Log(awards/bachelor’s degrees)
by ﬁeld in previous year — — — 0.349
— — — (0.054)
Field eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field   time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 324 234 234 234
R2 0.8931 0.955 0.9561 0.9634
Source: NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF program and
related data sets, as described in text.
Notes: Outside salary are earnings of college graduates aged 21–25. Outside salaries and un-
employment rates from Current Population Survey.uates (whose unemployment rate will be more volatile). Finally, in column
(4) we include a measure of the relative availability of awards by ﬁeld—the
number of awards divided by the number of bachelor’s graduates in the
field lagged one period. This shows that more students apply when the prob-
ability of obtaining an award is perceived to be higher. All of the speciﬁ-
cations show that the coeﬃcient on the log bachelor’s degrees is substan-
tially below unity. One likely reason for this is that the expansion of degrees
in the United States has occurred largely at institutions of lower academic
quality, so that the marginal bachelor’s graduate is unlikely to be of GRF
quality. In sum, the regression speciﬁcations in table 1.6 show that the
number of GRF applications responds substantially to the relative value of
the stipend and to the perceived availability of awards. For every 10 per-
cent increase in the stipend value, the number of applications goes up by 8
to 10 percent.
1.3.2 Measured Skills of Awardees
To see how the value of stipends aﬀects the measured achievement of
GRF awardees, we compare the GRE scores and GPAs of awardees over
time and across ﬁelds. Figure 1.9 provides a ﬁrst indication that stipend
values aﬀect the qualiﬁcations of the awardees. Figure 1.9, panel A shows
that the average GRE quantitative score of awardees has been higher when
the relative stipend value is higher. Figure 1.9, panel B shows a similar re-
lation between stipend values and average GRE verbal scores of awardees.
The time series of raw verbal scores trended downward beginning in 1987,
so we examined the time series of GRE verbal scores adjusted for trend, as
well as the raw time series. The trend-adjusted series shows a rise in scores
with the large increases in relative stipend values in the ﬁrst half of the
decade, and a subsequent fall in verbal scores throughout the 1990s. How-
ever, the continuing decline in GRE verbal scores through the late 1990s/
early 2000s cannot be explained by the evolution of stipend values, which
are rapidly rising during this time.
To quantify the pictures in the ﬁgures, we regressed measures of the
scholastic qualiﬁcations of awardees on the number and value of GRF
awards, using a cross-ﬁeld time series regression framework similar to that
in table 1.6, with ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁeld-speciﬁc time trends included in
all regressions. Table 1.7 gives the results of this analysis.19 The ﬁrst row of
coeﬃcients shows that the number of awardees has a signiﬁcant but quan-
titatively modest negative eﬀect on the measures of quality. An approximate
10 percent or 0.10 ln increase in the number of awards is associated with a
decline in average quantitative GRE scores by 1.1 points and a decline in
verbal GRE scores by 2.2 points on the 200 to 800 GRE scale, and a drop
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19. Freeman (2005) ﬁnds similar results with a diﬀerent speciﬁcation that suggests that the
basic ﬁndings in tables 1.6 and 1.7 are robust to some changes in speciﬁcations.in average GPA by 0.009 points (on a one to four scale). These ﬁndings are
consistent with the notion that as the number of fellowships increases, the
review panels move down the measured scholastic skill distribution to give
stipends to marginal awardees that are less outstanding than the inframar-
ginal winners. The larger drop in the verbal scores than in the quantitative
scores presumably reﬂects the wider variation in those scores and the extent
to which panels view high quantitative scores as more critical to success in
the sciences. The second row of coeﬃcients in table 1.7 shows that, with the
number of awards ﬁxed, increases in the relative value of fellowships in-
creases two of our measures of the skill of awardees, but has no discernible
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Fig. 1.9 Mean GRE scores of awardees and relative stipend value, 1968–2004: 
A, quantitative scores; B, verbal scores
Source: NSF DGE, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and related datasets. Salary data
estimated from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the March Current
Population Survey.
A
Beﬀect on the third measure. An increase in the relative value of the stipend
by 10 percent raises the average quantitative GRE score by 2.9 points and
raises the average verbal GRE score by 3.5 points. However, the average
GPA of awardees appears invariant to the stipend values.
Overall, the table 1.7 results on the GRE scores suggest that at least some
of the students on the margin of applying for a GRF fellowship are high-
achieving students who can be drawn away from other career or academic
opportunities through the prospect of larger awards. In the context of the
occupational choice model of Roy (1951), these results imply a positive
correlation between ability in science and engineering and ability in alter-
native careers: the able S&E students who are drawn into the GRF pro-
gram by higher stipends perform well on general measures of achievement
(i.e., GRE scores) that are associated with success in other occupations.
To test this interpretation, we regressed the number of applicants with
relatively high measured skills (deﬁned as those scoring 770 or over on the
GRE quantitative exam, 680 on the verbal GRE, and those with GPAs
above 3.88 on a four point scale) on the relative value of stipends and the
number of awards given. By controlling for the number of awards, we get a
measure of the relativenumber of applicants with high skills, which should
largely determine the measured skills of awardees. Column (1) of table 1.8
shows that a 10 percent increase in the stipend value raises the number of
applicants with 770 or over on the quantitative GRE by 12.2 percent. Col-
umn (2) shows a comparable increase in the number of applicants with 680
or over on the verbal GRE. The column (3) regression gives a 0.448 impact
of stipend values on the number of students with very high GPAs.20
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20. We also estimated models with the log of the number of applicants in the regression.
This gave smaller positive coeﬃcients to the relative stipend value in the regressions for the
Table 1.7 Determinants of awardee achievement, 1969–2004
GRE quantitative GRE verbal GPA
Log(number of awards) by ﬁeld   10.6  21.8  0.087
in current year (1.80) (3.30) (0.01)
Log(stipend/outside salary) in  29 35.4  0.007
previous year 3.3 6.1 0.017
Field eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Field   time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 324 324 270
R2 0.8943 0.684 0.7354
Source:Tabulated from NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF
Program and related data sets, as described in text.
Note: Outside salary are earnings of college graduates aged 21–25, tabulated from Current
Population Survey.In sum, higher stipend values incentivize enough high-achieving students
to seek GRF oﬀers to enable the NSF selection procedure to increase the
measured skills of awardees when stipend values are higher.
1.3.3 The Economic Supply Link
Overall, our results show that the resources NSF allocates to stipends,
through the number of awards and their value, aﬀects the supply of appli-
cants, both in terms of numbers and measured scholastic skills. As a sum-
mary of the economic supply link, we have graphed in ﬁgure 1.10our mea-
sure of the supply of students seeking GRFs—the number of applicants
relative to the number of S&E baccalaureates—and a measure of NSF’s
stipend budget (the number of awards oﬀered in a particular year multi-
plied by the stipend amount) relative to GDP, which we take as the broad-
est possible measure of other economic activity. The stipend budget is an
indicator of national resources spent to make graduate S&E study more ﬁ-
nancially attractive, whereas GDP represents national resources broadly.
The tight link between the two series gives the bottom line message: if the
United States wants more applicants for S&E fellowships and thus poten-
tially more graduate students and Ph.D.s in these ﬁelds, the country has to
spend more money on this objective.
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Table 1.8 Determinants of the number of applicants scoring above high thresholds
Log(applicants Log(applicants 
with GRE  with GRE  Log(applicants 
quantitative   770) verbal   680) with GPA   3.88)
(1) (2) (3)
Log(stipend/outside salary)  1.221 1.276 0.448
in previous year (0.104) (0.086) (0.100)
Log(number of awards)  0.539 0.664 0.512
by ﬁeld in current year (0.090) (0.074) (0.077)
Field eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Field   time trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 261 261 207
R2 0.9101 0.9097 0.9235
Source:Tabulated from NSF, Division of Graduate Education, Cumulative Index of the GRF
program and related data sets, as described in text.
Note: Outside salary are earnings of college graduates aged 21–25, tabulated from Current
Population Survey.
number of applicants with high math and verbal GREs, because the number of applicants is
dependent on stipend values and associated with the number of applicants with high scores.
It also raised the number with high GPAs, but conditional on the number of applicants, the
relative value of stipends were modestly negatively associated with the number of applicants
with high GPAs.1.4 Alternative Policy Scenarios
The analyses thus far have shown that the two policy levers—numbers
of GRFs and the dollar value of the awards—aﬀect the number and mea-
sured skills of persons seeking GRF awards and that coupled with NSF se-
lection procedures, they determine the measured skills of awardees. In this
section, we consider three scenarios that assess the way changes in the
mode of determining stipend policy could aﬀect the supply of students
seeking and obtaining GRFs.
1. Agency determined changes in the number and value of awards.
2. Granting awards and setting values through ﬁxed rules rather than
policy discretion.
3. Allocating the number of quality group 1 and 2 positions among dis-
ciplines on the basis of quantiﬁable academic skills of applicants rather
than on the number of applicants.
1.4.1 Agency Determined Changes in Stipend Numbers and Values
For this scenario, we assume that the goal of fellowship policy is to in-
crease the number of the “best and brightest” pursuing S&E graduate
Supporting “The Best and Brightest” in Science and Engineering 45
Fig. 1.10 Fraction of bachelors choosing to apply to GRF vs. total GRF stipend
budget/GDP
Source:NSF DGE, Cumulative Index of the GRF Program and related datasets. Data on the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, an agency of the U.S.
Department of Commerce.studies, and that both the numbers and qualiﬁcations of GRF awardees
contribute to the goal, as described in the model in the appendix. The
agency is assumed to face a ﬁxed budget constraint to reﬂect alternative
uses of resources. Our ﬁnding that increasing the number of awards re-
duces average quality while increasing the value of awards raises quality.
This yields an optimal solution that depends on the supply response of stu-
dents to number of awards and to the stipend amount. The critical factor
that determines whether it is better to give more awards or raise stipends
are the characteristics of applicants who are on the margin of winning
awards.
There are two ways to estimate the impact of changes in awards on the
margin on the measured attributes of awardees. The ﬁrst is to regress aver-
age GREs or other indicators of academic skills on the number of
awardees, as we did in table 1.7, where the estimates suggested that average
skills were not that sensitive to increased numbers of awards. The second
way to assess skills on the margin is to go back to the micro records on in-
dividual attributes and rank applicants by the probability that they would
get an award and then to examine the characteristics of those who would
be given awards on the margin. To do this, we estimated the probability of
getting awards in 2004 and then computed the quantitative and verbal
GRE scores and GPA for awardees with the lowest probabilities in bins 
of ﬁfty persons. We also estimated the average GRE and GPA for non-
awardees with the highest probabilities of having gained an NSF, again in
groups of ﬁfty. The diﬀerence in attributes between these nonawardees and
the awardees in the lowest group reﬂects the potential change in quality
from increasing the number of awards.
Figure 1.11 displays the results of our calculations in terms of the at-
tributes of awardees and nonawardees. Persons in group 1 are awardees
with the highest probability of getting an award. Persons in group 2 are
awardees with the next highest probability of getting an award, and so 
on. Group 5 consists of awardees in the lowest probability group of get-
ting an award. Groups 6 through 10 consist of persons who did not get an
award, with those whom we estimated as most likely to get an award placed
in group 6, followed by persons with less likelihood of getting an award in
groups 7 through 10. The ﬁgure shows that there is very little diﬀerence in
the GRE Quantitative measures around the cutoﬀ point between groups 5
and 6. This indicates that the number of awards could have been increased
along a substantial margin without greatly reducing quality, or could have
been reduced along a substantial margin without greatly increasing qual-
ity. But the ﬁgure does show a noticeable drop in GRE Verbal scores be-
tween the marginal awardees and the marginal nonawardees. In part, this
reﬂects the fact that while our model does a good job of predicting who gets
an award, the errors in the model are for persons along the margin.
Table 1.9 simulates what would happen if NSF has $10 million addi-
46 Richard B. Freeman, Tanwin Chang, and Hanley Chiangtional funding to spend and divided the spending in three diﬀerent ways:
by increasing the number of awards, by increasing the value of awards, and
by spending half of the additional money on increasing the number and
half on increasing the value. Spending all of the money on increasing the
number of awards at current stipend amounts would add 333 awardees and
would give awards to persons with modestly lower GRE quantitative and
verbal scores than current awardees—4.9 points lower in the quantitative
GRE and 29.0 points lower in the verbal GRE. Because NSF gave 1,020
awards, the impact of the lower scores for the 333 awardees on the average
for all awardees is considerably smaller. Spending all of the money on in-
creasing stipend values would raise awards by 32.7 percent and would
change the overall mean GRE scores of awardees modestly. If such a large
increase in stipends were to attract more able persons, this improved qual-
ity does not readily show up in the GRE measures. Finally, dividing the 10
million dollars between additional awards and higher valued stipends
would increase the number of awards by 146. The increased stipend at-
tracts just enough higher scoring applicants to oﬀset the mean quality de-
crease associated with more awardees. The result is virtually no change in
the average measures of awardee skills.
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Fig. 1.11 Quality of GRF applicants on the margin of getting an award
Notes: All persons to the left of the line were given awards. All persons to the right of the line
did not get awards. The numbers related to groups of 50 persons, ordered by the estimated
probability they would win an NSF award. The 5th group consists of 50 awardees with the 
lowest probability of getting an award, the 4th group consists of 50 awardees with the next low-
est probability, and so on. The 6th group consists of the 50 non-awardees with the highest
probability of getting an award. The probabilities are predicted values from an OLS regres-
sion of an award receipt dummy variable on panel rating, female dummy, underrepresented
minority dummy, and eight ﬁeld dummies.It is easy to use our analysis to simulate the outcomes of other hypothe-
sized changes in the NSF stipend budget and its allocation between num-
bers of awards and stipend values.
1.4.2 Using Fixed Rules to Determine the 
Number and/or Value of Stipends
An alternative way to set the number and/or value of stipends is to use a
ﬁxed rule to set them. Monetary economists and oﬃcials have often dis-
cussed using ﬁxed rules to set the growth of money supply. Some central
banks target a range of rate of inﬂation as their goal while others focus on
keeping interest rates within some band. Fixed rules increase social secu-
rity payments with inﬂation and have been proposed to raise minimum
wages and income tax brackets with inﬂation rather than through legisla-
tive means. If policymakers chose a given adjustment rule, the value or
number of stipends would increase according to the rule.
There are diverse rules that policymakers could use to set stipend values
and the numbers of stipends. Taking the value of stipends, one possible
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Table 1.9 Impact of hypothetical $10 million increase in annual funding on selected outcomes








awardees Change % Change
in annual in relative
number  of value  of GRE GRE GRE GRE 
awardees stipend quantitative verbal quantitative verbal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All extra funds to 
increasing number 
of awards 333 0.00  4.9  29  1.2  7.1
All extra funds to 
increasing value 
of stipends 0 32.70 n.a. n.a. 8.2 10
Half to additional 
awards and half 
to higher stipend 146 14.30 n.a. n.a. 3.3 0.7
Notes:Nonawardees in 2004 were ranked by their predicted probability of award receipt; see text for de-
tails. For a given increase of N in the number of awards, columns (3) and (4) are calculated by subtract-
ing the mean quality of the actual 2004 awardees from the mean quality of the top N nonawardees. In
column (5)/(6), the change in the overall mean quality induced by more awardees is calculated by multi-
plying column (3)/(4) by N/(1,020   N), given that 1,020 awards were actually granted in 2004. The
change in the overall mean quality induced by higher stipend values is calculated from the coeﬃcients in
columns (1) and (3) of table 1.7. The change in overall mean quality induced by both more awards and
higher stipend values is the sum of the two preceding changes. n.a.   not applicable.rule would be to set stipends as a percentage of alternative earnings in the
labor market, such as the earnings of young college graduates. Another
would be to make stipends a given percentage of the earnings of doctor-
ates. Yet another would be to adjust stipends to measures of employment
opportunities, such as unemployment rates or, given low rates of jobless-
ness among S&E doctorates, the length of time to obtaining a job upon
completion of a Ph.D., or to the growth of R&D spending. Since any single
indicator would be subject to measurement error, perhaps the most sens-
ible target would be a weighted average of indicators: stipends would rise/
fall as the average of the indicators increased or decreased.
To set the number of stipends by a ﬁxed rule, policymakers could simply
make them a given proportion of the number of BS graduates, thereby as-
suring students in diﬀerent cohorts the same probability of gaining a
stipend. When the supply of S&E baccalaureates increased, so too would
stipend availability. Alternatively, one could use the same set of weighted
indicators for setting the number of stipends as for setting the value of
stipends.
To get some sense of how a ﬁxed rule would set the value and number of
GRF stipends, we have simulated what would happen to the number of
awards and measured scholastic achievement of GRF awardees under two
conditions: (a) that NSF ﬁxed the number of awards at 0.41 percent of S&E
bachelor’s degrees, the level in 1968, before the ratio of awards to bachelor’s
graduates began to fall; and (b) that NSF set stipends at the 2004 ratio of
the value of stipends to the earnings of young college graduates from the
current population survey (CPS), 115.8 percent. By setting numbers using
a high awards per S&E baccalaureate and setting values at a high value to
earnings of young college graduates, we get an upper bound on how a set
of ﬁxed rules would aﬀect the supply of applicants to the ﬁeld. Table 1.10
shows what would have happened from the 1970s to the 2000s if these ﬁxed
rules had been employed. The greater number of awards would have low-
ered measured scholastic skills, but the higher value of awards would have
attracted enough applicants with greater skills to allow NSF to raise aver-
age quality. Bottom line, these rules would have given awards to a larger
number of persons and, given our supply equations, would have raised the
average quality of awardees, as well.
Alternative sets of rules would, of course, give diﬀerent outcomes.
1.4.3 Equilibrating Quality Across Disciplines
Our ﬁnal policy scenario considers what might happen if NSF changed
its charge to panel committees from giving awards in approximately the
same proportion to the number of applicants among ﬁelds to giving awards
in a pure “measured scholastic” achievement, irrespective of the number 
of applicants from diﬀerent ﬁelds. Thus, if physics received 100 applicants,
all of whom had higher GREs, GPAs, and so on than, say social science,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.which had 500 applicants, all 100 physics applicants would receive awards
before any social science applicant would receive an award. To see how
awards would be given among disciplines under this hypothetical system,
we estimated a linear probability regression of actual award receipt on GRE
Quant, GRE Verbal, GPA, reference score (normalized), female indicator,
and minority indicator in 1997, the last year for which we had a full set of
scholastic qualiﬁcation measures. In 1997, NSF awarded 850 GRFs, so un-
der the hypothetical system, the applicants with the highest 850 predicted
probabilities would be oﬀered an award. Since physical science and mathe-
matics and computer science students have the skills to shift to other ﬁelds
and do well while students in the social sciences, psychology, and life sci-
ences cannot easily shift into the physical and mathematical sciences, we
anticipated that this change in policy would beneﬁt the “harder” sciences.
The calculations summarized in table 1.11 tell a diﬀerent story. Column
(1) gives the number and percentage of applicants in each ﬁeld in 1997.
Column (2) gives the number and percentage of awardees in each ﬁeld. The
percentages of awards by discipline diﬀer moderately from the percentages
of applicants by discipline, with engineering gaining more awards and life
sciences gaining fewer awards, due in part to the WECS program. Column
(3) gives our hypothetical distribution of awards by discipline on the basis
of the measured scholastic attributes. The table note shows the coeﬃcients
of the equation used to generate the hypothetical distribution. It gives
equal weight to the quantitative GRE and verbal GRE and a relatively
heavy weight on the measure of references.
The hypothetical distribution shows some diﬀerences from the 1997 ac-
tual distribution of awardees among natural science ﬁelds: mathematics,
chemistry, and physics/astronomy gain a few awards while earth and at-
mospheric sciences and life sciences get fewer awards. The biggest change,
however, is between engineering and the social sciences and psychology.
Engineering loses a substantial number of awards, where social sciences
and psychology gain. Why? The social sciences have the highest mean ver-
bal scores whereas engineering has the lowest mean verbal scores. The so-
cial sciences and psychology score best on the reference letters. The GRE
quantitative scores favor the physical and mathematical sciences, includ-
ing engineering, but a larger proportion of students obtain top scores in the
GRE quantitative test than in the GRE verbal test, which puts a bound on
the extent to which our hypothetical allocation gives awards to those ﬁelds.
It is possible that other simulations could give a somewhat diﬀerent story:
a high GPA in mathematics or physics may be more diﬃcult to attain than
one in the social sciences or biology, and reference letters do not compare
students across ﬁelds. Still, it would take a very diﬀerent set of calculations
to support our initial expectation: that if NSF gave awards with no refer-
ence to ﬁelds, the physical sciences and mathematics would get more GRFs
and the other sciences would get less awards.
Supporting “The Best and Brightest” in Science and Engineering 511.5 Conclusion
Stipends to U.S. citizens/residents are a natural policy tool for increas-
ing the incentive for Americans to enter S&E ﬁelds without directly im-
pacting the ﬂow of talent from overseas. Analysis of NSF Graduate Re-
search Fellowships suggests that raising the value of awards increases the
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Table 1.11 Existing and hypothetical allocation of GRF awards across ﬁelds in 1997.
Number of candidates
(% in parentheses) Mean applicant quality
Awardees Awardees Quanti-
Field Applicants actual hypothetical tative Verbal GPA Reference
Chemistry 358 57 69 709 586 3.66  0.05
(7.0) (6.7) (8.1)
Computer 261 47 46 730 600 3.66  0.02
Science (5.1) (5.5) (5.4)
Engineering 1,212 252 184 728 573 3.67 0.05
(23.6) (29.6) (21.7)
Earth/ 194 32 25 690 603 3.57  0.05
Atmospheric (3.8) (3.8) (2.9)
Life Science 1,502 210 198 686 605 3.54  0.09
(29.3) (24.7) (23.3)
Math 242 41 59 747 614 3.69  0.12
(4.7) (4.8) (6.9)
Physics/ 330 58 62 749 632 3.72  0.26
Astronomy (6.4) (6.8) (7.3)
Psychology 331 48 63 653 615 3.57 0.27
(6.4) (5.6) (7.4)
Social Science 698 105 144 667 642 3.60 0.19
(13.6) (12.4) (16.9)
Total 5,128 850 850 702 604 3.62 0.00
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Notes: Awards under the “hypothetical” system are allocated as follows. A linear probability regression
of actual award receipt on GRE quantitative, GRE verbal, GPA, reference score (normalized), female
indicator, and minority indicator was used to predict the probability of being oﬀered an award in 1997.
Under the hypothetical system, applicants with the highest 850 predicted probabilities are designated as
being oﬀered an award.
Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs   4566
R-squared   0.1772
gotaward Coef. Std. Err. t
quant/100 .0541323 .0062852 8.61
verbal/100 .0582354 .0056672 10.28
gpa .1265555 .0153695 8.23
refscore .0879098 .0050868 17.28
female .059188 .011009 5.38
minority .0319515 .0126827 2.52
_cons  1.04754 .0670683  15.62number of applicants and quality of awardees, while giving more awards
increases the number of awardees, by deﬁnition, with only a modest re-
duction in measured academic skills. Because the analysis is limited to a
single stipend program, it is uncertain whether the ﬁnding that the number
of applicants responds to the relative value and relative number of stipends
can be extrapolated to the market for graduate students as a whole. To the
extent that changes in NSF fellowship policy induce changes in the policies
of other stipend-granting groups, we suspect that the qualitative results, at
least, can be extrapolated to the broader market.
To see if such an extrapolation is at least consistent with the data, we ex-
amined the changing number of ﬁrst-year ﬁrst-time graduate students in
science and engineering who were U.S. citizens and permanent residents
relative to the number of S&E bachelor’s graduates in the United States.
Appendix tables 1A.1 and 1A.2 give the results of our analysis. Columns
(1) and (2) in appendix table 1A.1 show the number and percentage change
in all ﬁrst-year full-time students, including international students. Col-
umns (3) and (4) give the number and percentage change in number of ﬁrst-
year graduate students who were U.S. citizens/permanent residents and
thus likely to be aﬀected by higher valued awards for U.S. students. The ﬁ-
nal columns show an increased proportion of S&E bachelor’s graduates
enrolling in graduate school over this period. These statistics show greater
increase in U.S. citizen/permanent resident ﬁrst year enrollments during
the period when NSF increased the value of awards, and an increase in 
the number of graduate students relative to S&E bachelor’s graduates. The 
regression analyses in appendix table 1A.2 conﬁrm this reading of the 
evidence. They relate the logarithm of the number of ﬁrst-time full-time
citizen/residents graduate enrollments to the value of stipends relative to
college graduate salaries (column [1]) over the period and the log of the
number of enrollments to the number of GRF applicants the previous
spring. The estimates in column (1) give an elasticity of enrollments to the
value of the stipends of nearly 0.40, which is less than half the elasticity of
GRF applicants to stipends found in table 1.6. The estimates in column (2)
show that indeed the increased enrollments are associated with increased
applicants to the GRF program.21
Given the small sample sizes and limited time series variation, we view
the appendix tables 1A.1 and 1A.2 analyses as suggestive. The results are
consistent with the notion that more and better-paying stipends could raise
the number of native-born/residents choosing S&E ﬁelds broadly. To go
further than that would require a more extensive analysis of the decision of
students to pursue S&E graduate studies as opposed to other options (such
as simply applying for the GRF) and a careful study of the responses of
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21. Analyses that eliminated social science and psychology bachelor’s graduates from the
calculations gave similar results to those in the appendix tables.universities, other government agencies, and nonproﬁt groups to NSF
stipend policies.
Appendix
Model of Optimal Stipend Policy
As a starting point for analyzing stipend policy, we consider the choices
and constraints faced by an abstract granting agency. We assume that the
granting agency cares about the number of awards (N) that it grants each
year and the average quality (Q) of the students who receive the awards.
The real-world analogue is that the NSF would like to support as many stu-
dents as possible for graduate study in S&E, but at the same time the NSF
would like its fellowship recipients to be as high-achieving as possible. The
agency thus seeks to maximize
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Table 1A.1 First-time, full-time graduate students in science and engineering
First-time, full-time 
First-time, full-time graduate students in S&E
(U.S. citizens & perm. res.) graduate students in S&E
U.S. ﬁrst-time, full-time
Number of Annual Number of Annual  graduate students as % of
Year students growth (%) students growth (%) U.S. S&E bachelor degrees
1987 71,183 — 48,121 — 15.6
1988 70,894  0.4 46,478  3.4 15.2
1989 74,400 4.9 48,309 3.9 15.9
1990 76,597 3.0 49,145 1.7 15.7
1991 81,484 6.4 52,186 6.2 16.1
1992 83,159 2.1 54,603 4.6 15.9
1993 79,366  4.6 54,027  1.1 15.3
1994 77,968  1.8 54,318 0.5 15.0
1995 74,384  4.6 52,378  3.6 14.4
1996 73,479  1.2 51,260  2.1 13.9
1997 73,544 0.1 50,375  1.7 13.5
1998 74,431 1.2 49,828  1.1 13.3
1999 75,447 1.4 48,362  2.9 12.7
2000 78,332 3.8 46,316  4.2 12.1
2001 82,411 5.2 48,207 4.1 12.5
2002 86,827 5.4 54,625 13.3 13.7
2003 89,331 2.9 59,649 9.2 14.1
2004 86,565  3.1 58,853  1.3 13.5
Source: National Science Foundation, Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and
Engineering (GSS), various years; Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Completions Sur-
vey, various years; and authors’ tabulations and imputations.(A1) U   aN   (1   a)Q.
a weighted average of N and Q where a is the weight placed on numbers.
The agency has two policy levers to do this: the numbers of stipends (N)
and the annual value of stipends (V). The agency faces a budget constraint
(A2) NV   K,
where K is the (ﬁxed) total annual budget allocated to stipends.
The agency’s choice of N and V aﬀects the quality of awardees. Average
recipient quality is modeled as
(A3) Q   Q(V, N, other factors),
where  Q/ V 0 because higher-valued stipends are able to attract higher-
achieving candidates who would otherwise have pursued alternative ﬁelds
and careers or seek other fellowships. We also expect that  Q/ N   0: av-
erage quality of the awardees declines with the number of awards because
the highest-achieving students are generally the ﬁrst to obtain awards. The
optimal policy in this model, derived from maximizing the objective (A1)
subject to the constraints (A2) and (A3), is characterized by the following
condition:
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Table 1A.2 Determinants of ﬁrst-time, full-time fall graduate enrollment in science
and engineering
Dependent variable: Logarithm
of ﬁrst-time, full-time graduate
enrollment in S&E by U.S.
citizens and permanent 
residents
Independent variables (1) (2)
Ln(GRF stipend / outside salary) 
from previous calendar year 0.397 —
(0.088)*** —
Ln(GRF applicants) from most 
recent spring — 0.284
— (0.038)***
Ln(S&E bachelors degrees) from 




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Analysis period is 1987 through 2004.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.(A4) a   (1   a)       (1   a).
The optimal policy is to equate the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost
of funding another student. The marginal beneﬁt, given on the left-hand
side of (A4), is simply the subjective value (a) that the agency places on be-
ing able to support an additional student. The marginal cost, on the right-
hand side, consists of two terms. The ﬁrst term denotes the marginal de-
crease in quality resulting directly from giving more awards. The second
term reﬂects the fact that, in the face of a ﬁxed budget, a larger number of
awards necessitates a lower annual stipend value, which in turn lowers the
average quality of awardees.
This model suggests that the relationship between stipend values and
awardee quality is of central interest. How do higher stipend values bring
higher-achieving students into the GRFP program? The main mechanism
underlying this relationship is that higher stipend values attract a larger ap-
plicant pool, and at least some of the additional applicants are highly able
candidates who are pulled away from alternative careers (or from immedi-
ate entry into the labor market). Essentially, larger applicant pools allow
the agency to be more selective in granting awards. Thus, it is also of inter-
est to examine the factors that determine the number of applicants to the
GRFP program. We model the number of applicants (A) as
(A5) A   A(N 1, V, Other factors),
where N–1 is the number of awards granted in the previous year. We predict
that  A/ V 0 and  A/ N–1  0; that is, more students apply when stipend
values increase and when the perceived probability of receiving an award
rises. Other factors predicted to inﬂuence the applicant pool include the at-
tractiveness of alternative careers.
Thus, equations (A1) through (A5) capture the quality-quantity choice
facing a stipend-granting agency: to spend its budget on funding many 
students versus funding a few “superstars.” Since identiﬁcation of stars is
diﬃcult in most disciplines, the choice is in fact more complex. The key be-
havioral relations to be empirically estimated are: the change in the qual-
ity of students as the number of awardees is increased; the change in qual-
ity in response to the value of stipends; and the change in the number of
applicants as stipend values rise. If the agencies responsible for stipend
policy optimizes as in this model, then the preceding model reﬂects the ba-
sic tradeoﬀs factoring into the agencies’ decisions. In this case the number
and monetary value of GRFP fellowships cannot be assumed to be exoge-
nous for the purposes of estimating behavioral relationships. On the other
hand, if the number and value of GRFP fellowships depend on vagaries of
budgeting, then adjustments to the number and value of stipends consti-
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